The brain processes distinct attributes such as colour and motion in anatomically largely segregated systems. Moreover, these two attributes are perceived with diVerent latencies. Here, we show that the time required to bind these two attributes diVers too. In psychophysical experiments, we determined minimal presentation times required to perceptually pair spatially separate pairs of stimuli consisting of colour or motion. Binding two colours required longer presentation times than binding the directions of two moving stimuli. Crossattribute binding between colour and motion took longer than within-attribute binding. This was so even when the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion was compensated for, which accelerated colour-motion binding. Moreover, stimuli could be discriminated but not bound at fast presentation rates. Our results thus show that spatial binding is an attribute-speciWc process and faster within the same than across diVerent attributes. Furthermore, the time required to bind attributes is independent of that required to process them, since colour is perceived before motion but requires longer time for binding. Finally, our results suggest that binding acts on attribute-speciWc neural representations of the stimuli at a late, perceptually explicit stage. These results lead us to conclude that spatial binding is separate from, and subsequent to, stimulus processing and that it is an attribute-dependent and post-conscious process.
Introduction
The visual system is organized according to the principle of functional specialization, in that diVerent visual attributes such as colour and motion are processed by anatomically segregated systems (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Zeki et al., 1991; Zeki, 1978) . Colour is processed predominantly by cells in the blobs of V1, the thin stripes of V2 and the V4-complex, while the motion processing pathway extends from cells of layer 4B in V1 to the thick stripes in V2 and to area V5 (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987; Shipp & Zeki, 1985b; Sincich & Horton, 2005; Zeki & Shipp, 1988) . It is important to note that the two systems have direct yet sparse connections (Shipp & Zeki, 1995) and both receive input from the M-and P-systems, thus allowing for some interaction between them as is reXected in the capacity of a fraction of motion selective cells to respond, even if grudgingly, to isoluminant colour stimuli (Logothetis, Schiller, Charles, & Hurlbert, 1990; Sincich & Horton, 2002) . The two systems nevertheless diVer systematically in their conduction velocities and signal arrival times, which is probably a consequence of the diVerential myelination of their axonal connections (Beckers & Zeki, 1995; Flechsig, 1901; Schmolesky et al., 1998) . A perceptual correlate of this segregation is that diVerent attributes are also perceived with diVerent delays, with the consequence that for a stimulus changing in both colour and motion to be perceived in synchrony, changes in colour have to lag behind changes in motion (Arnold, CliVord, & Wenderoth, 2001; Bedell, Chung, Ogmen, & Patel, 2003; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Nishida & Johnston, 2002; Viviani & Aymoz, 2001 ). These Wndings, together with patient and imaging data, have led us to propose that the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion reXects directly neuronal processing delays within the distinct systems involved, and that neural activity in them accounts directly for the (conscious) percepts of the features processed . This view is supported by several elegant psychophysical experiments, all suggesting that the time course of perceptual experience correlates directly with that of neural activity (Arnold, 2005; Arnold & CliVord, 2002; Arnold et al., 2001; Bedell et al., 2003; CliVord, Spehar, & Pearson, 2004) . For example, the relative perceptual delay of a motion stimulus is reduced as a function of the angle of the direction change: motion direction changes of 180° lead to longer perceptual delays than direction changes of smaller angles, in direct accord with the degree of inhibition and thus latency for the direction selective neurons of V5 (Arnold & CliVord, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003) . Similarly, when transients of neuronal inhibition in the motion system are reduced through motion transparency the relative delay of motion can be much reduced (CliVord et al., 2004) . The important point here is the existence of relative perceptual delays, even if their exact duration may be aVected by the perceptual saliency or task conditions (Adams & Mamassian, 2004) . Our view, supported by these Wndings, thus diVers from that postulating 'temporal markers.' These have been proposed to render temporal aspects of perception independent of the neural activity underlying attribute-speciWc processing, such that physically simultaneously occurring events are also perceived in synchrony (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Johnston & Nishida, 2001; Nishida & Johnston, 2002) . The psychophysical Wndings described above run counter to this, and have led us to propose that not only perception, but also perceptual binding occurs in a distributed fashion, thus allowing it to occur between any two neural stimulus representations ). In the experiments described here we tested our prediction that the time required for binding diVers depending on the attribute pairs to be bound, since partly distinct neural machineries would underlie the binding process.
In a series of psychophysical experiments we measured the time required to visually associate distinct attributes with each other. We used spatially separated stimuli as this allowed us to measure binding times both within an attribute (for example motion-with-motion or colour-with-colour) and across attributes (motion-with-colour). This form of binding across space is a necessary prerequisite for many visual functions, above all the recognition of objects and more generally for Wgure-background segregation based on constituent features, which may be non-contiguous due to occlusion.
Given that colour is perceived before motion, one would predict that colour would also be bound before motion. In fact, our results show exactly the reverse. In contrast to perceptual latencies, the time required for binding is consistent with the velocities of signal conduction within the cortical components of the distinct processing systems. The Wbres of motion processing regions like V5 (as well as the Wbres connecting the V5s of both hemispheres) are heavily myelinated while of those of V4 (as well as those linking the V4s) are not (Flechsig, 1901 ) (see also Section 4). Correspondingly, we found that binding across attributes was slower than within attributes, consistent with the comparably sparser connections between the systems (Shipp & Zeki, 1995) .
The results of our experiments show that, as in perception, the minimal time required for binding diVers between attributes (but in a direction opposite to what might have been expected from relative perceptual delays), and that binding is slower across attributes than within them. Furthermore, binding of colour and motion seems to occur after stimulus processing is complete, leading us to conclude that spatial binding is an attribute-speciWc and postconscious phenomenon.
Methods
Eight subjects (three females, age range 19-32) participated in total: all eight in Experiment 1 and four in Experiments 2-4. All but two (S.W. and A.B.) were naïve with regards to the purpose of the experiment. Cogent software (John Romaya, Vision Lab, UCL; www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk) running under Matlab (Mathworks) on a Windows PC was used for stimulus presentation on a Sony 21 in. CRT monitor operating at 85 Hz. Below we Wrst describe the basic stimulus features and then the diVerent experiments.
Basic stimulus features
Stimuli alternated between two states at a Wxed frequency in each trial and were presented in two squares of 6.45 deg width on either side of the Wxation cross, with an eccentricity of 6.45 deg to their midpoints. There were three trial types: both squares colour, both motion, or one colour and one motion (Fig. 1) .
Colours alternated in two pairs, either red/cyan or green/magenta. Before the experiment pairs were adjusted such that they fused into gray at high Xicker frequencies and were set to isoluminance (12.3 cd/m 2 ) for each subject using heterochromatic Xicker photometry in the same conWguration at 21 Hz (Kaiser, 1991) ) (measured using a PhotoResearch PR650 Spectrometer). In colour-colour trials diVerent pairs of colours were used in the two squares, and correspondingly orthogonal directions Each trial ended with a 2AFC test prompt (randomized in side and identity in every trial) to indicate the correct pairing. (E) Trials lasted 4 s or until interrupted by the subject and were Xanked by masks during which the oscillation frequency was ramped up or down from maximal to the trial oscillation frequency or vice versa, followed by the test prompt.
of motion in motion-motion trials. Motion was derived from a checkerboard of randomly assembled patches of the above colours (0.26 deg width) that moved behind the square, either up/down or left/right at a velocity of 5.5 deg/s. Isoluminant colours constitute a suboptimal stimulus for the motion pathway, thus providing a conservative motion stimulus given our hypothesis that integration time for motion would be shorter. If anything, our stimuli would thus have reduced the eVect of our expected Wnding. The subjective experience of the stimuli was really that of two separate stimuli-in particular, it is important to note that the motion stimuli were in no instance perceived as belonging to a 'global motion vector.' Our choice of a horizontal (or vertical) stimulus arrangement with orthogonal motion directions and Wxation in the middle was such that it would be physically inconsistent with a single solid object moving, rotating or expanding behind two apertures. Instead, the nearest mental image one could make of the stimulus if urged to do so would be that of two separate objects that pull each other through a rope that runs around a 90 deg corner, which is in our view thus quite far from the perception of a 'global' motion vector.
Task conditions 2.2.1. Experiment 1
This was the main experiment, designed to determine the temporal limit of spatial binding for three attribute pairs (colour-colour, motionmotion, and colour-motion). In detail, the subject would Wxate a central Wxation cross, while the attributes in the squares to its left and right would alternate between two states, simultaneously and with a Wxed frequency. For example, in a colour-colour trial, the left square may alternate between red and cyan, while the right square may alternate (simultaneously with the left) between green and magenta. In this example, the only two possible states of the complete stimulus would be either red (left) and green (right) or cyan (left) and magenta (right). The task of the subject was to determine which of the colours were paired (i.e., appeared simultaneously) on the left and right. In the ensuing two alternatives forced choice (2AFC) task one of the two colours of one of the two squares would be shown, with the other square in grey (a neutral prompt). For example, the left square would be displayed in red and the right in grey. By pressing keys on the computer keyboard the subject then had to set the colour of the right square (in this example) either to green (correct) or magenta (incorrect). Motion-motion trials or colour-motion trials were organized analogous to this example with the corresponding attributes. Trials of all three binding types were presented in random order in each session, with systematically varying but randomly ordered stimulus alternation rates across trials. Trials were Xanked by masks of gradually decreasing or increasing stimulus alternation frequencies. The (unmasked) trial lasted for four seconds or until button-press when subjects indicated their choice of the perceived pairing in the 2AFC task. To avoid attentional biases the 'side' and 'identity' of the 2AFC prompt (e.g. with which colour on the left ( D 'side') was red ( D 'identity') paired) was changed randomly with every trial. Correspondingly, all possible stimulus conWgurations were presented in a random and frequency balanced order. On the example of colour-colour trials: red/cyan would equally often alternate on the left as on the right ( D 'side'); red in one square would be equally often paired simultaneously with green or with magenta in the other square ( D 'identity'); and Wnally a trial would equally often begin with red and with cyan ( D 'face'). There were thus 2 3 D 8 conWgurations for each of the three binding trial types. In each session trials of the same binding type and period were thus repeated eight times, leading to a typical number of about 240 trials per session for 10 alternation frequencies. Subjects performed eight to twenty sessions each, the initial sessions were discarded as training sessions. Four subjects performed the experiment for both a horizontal and a vertical stimulus conWguration.
Experiment 2
This experiment served to determine the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion (see Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997 , for details). The general structure of this experiment was similar to that of the Wrst experiment. In contrast to it, all trials were performed at a Wxed alternation frequency, namely for each subject at its critical alternation period (75% correct) as determined in Experiment 1. Instead, across trials the change in colour was systematically delayed with respect to that in motion covering 0-360 deg phase shifts in steps of two to three frames, typically leading to about 20 diVerent phase shifts. Like in Experiment 1, the subject had to decide in each trial on the correct pairing of the two stimuli in a 2AFC task. Subjects performed Wve sessions each with four trials per phase shift in each session. At every phase the rate with which the subject paired the motion direction that would be paired with the colour at 0 deg phase was measured. The resulting mean vector indicated the relative delay of this subjects' motion percept (see Fig. 3 ). Randomizations, masks, etc. were as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3
This was a replication of Experiment 1, but with trial types consisting of colour-colour, colour-motion with zero phase shift, and colour-motion with a phase shift as determined in Experiment 2 for each subject.
Experiment 4
This experiment served to conWrm whether at high oscillation rates the features of the stimuli (identities of colours, directions of motion) could be perceived but not bound. First, subjects adjusted the oscillation period of colour-colour or motion-motion stimulus pairs until they could just conWdently discriminate the stimulus features (eight repeats per subject). Subsequently subjects were tested at the determined mean oscillation period for their ability to (a) discriminate the stimuli (in a 2AFC task requiring them to indicate e.g. which colour was presented on which side of the display) and (b) to spatially associate the stimulus pairs like in Experiment 1, each in 24 trials.
Analysis
The critical alternation period necessary to allow spatial binding was deWned as the point where subjects performed with a 75% success rate in the 2AFC task (50% D chance). For every session and each trial type psychometric functions were Wtted to the logistic function using the psigniWt toolbox for Matlab version 2.5.6 (http://www.bootstrap-software.com), which implements the maximum-likelihood method described by Wichmann and Hill (2001a) . (Note that it uses the 75% point of the normalized Wtted curve (and not the absolute 75% point), as it treats the variable lapse rate of maximal performance as a nuisance parameter). Two independent statistical tests were performed in each subject. Firstly, a one-way (repeated measures) ANOVA with the critical alternation period of the three trial types as factors across all sessions (between 8 and 20) was performed for each subject separately. DiVerences between all three pairs of the three trial types were assessed using a two-sided Newman-Keuls corrected post hoc test. Secondly, diVerences between psychometric functions of each type (pooled across sessions) were tested using psigniWt by MonteCarlo simulations testing the null hypothesis that the functions can be generated from a binomial process of a single function (Wichmann & Hill, 2001b) . Both methods gave consistent results, and we report only results that reached signiWcance in both the corrected ANOVA post hoc test and the Monte-Carlo test (with at least p < .05).
Results

Binding times depend on attributes to be bound
In the Wrst and main experiment we determined the time required to associate pairs of separate stimuli belonging either to the same (motion-motion, or colour-colour) or to two diVerent (motion-colour) attributes, with each other (see Fig. 1 and Section 2). The time required for binding was assessed in eight subjects in a 2AFC task as a function of the alternation period. In all eight, there was a consistent temporal diVerence in performance depending upon the pairs of attributes to be bound. The shortest critical binding period was for motion-motion (period D 0.269 s § 0.033 SD, n D 8), followed by colour-colour (0.328 s § 0.031 SD), followed by colour-motion (0.544 s § 0.142 SD) ( Fig. 2A) . In each subject colour-motion binding diVered signiWcantly from both within-attribute binding pairs (p < .001 for both Monte-Carlo and ANOVA across sessions) and in six out of eight subjects the diVerence between motion-motion and colour-colour was signiWcant (p < .05 for both tests). Figs. 2B-E show psychometric data along with Wtted curves of four subjects. In four subjects, sessions with a vertical and a horizontal stimulus arrangement had been alternated. Both arrangements led in every subject to the same sequence of critical binding periods as reported above.
Perceptual delays aVect binding times but do only partly account for slower across-attribute binding
One reason for the longer critical period for across-feature binding may be the previously reported diVerential latency between colour and motion perception. If binding occurs subsequent to perception, then one would expect that the relative lag between the perception of colour and motion to be reXected in binding the two non-synchronous signals: if the neural signals used for binding are not simultaneously available, binding would either fail or have to 'wait' until both signals are available and therefore be less eYcient. We thus conducted two follow-up experiments to test whether the slow across-feature binding integration times may in part be accounted for by diVerential perceptual latencies between colour and motion. First we determined the relative perceptual lag of motion relative to colour at the critical alternation frequency in four subjects, Fig. 2 . Minimal stimulus integration times for spatial binding diVer between attributes. Motion-motion can be bound at the fastest oscillation period, followed by colour-colour, followed by colour-motion. (A) Attribute-speciWc critical stimulus alternation periods (at 75% correct in a 2AFC task) for spatial binding averaged over all eight subjects, §SEM. (B-E) Single subject examples of four from eight subjects. Plotted are session-averaged psychometrical data (dots) and Wtted logistic curves (continuous lines) for binding performance as a function of stimulus oscillation period. In each subject integration times of diVerent attributes diVered consistently (motion-motion < colour-colour < colour-motion) and signiWcantly as assessed using corrected ANOVA across sessions and Monte-Carlo simulations (p < .05). Bars and whiskers indicate conWdence levels corresponding to 1 and 2 SD at 75% performance according to 4999 psigniWt BCa bootstrap simulations (Wichmann & Hill, 2001b) . The critical period for colour-motion binding could be reduced by taking into account the relative perceptual delays between colour and motion (p < .05, same tests as in Fig. 2 ), but in every subject cross-attribute binding remained slower than within-attribute binding (p < .05). Top (Experiment 2): Polar plot indicating the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion for each subject. The average vector (red) indicates the physical delay (expressed as phase relative to oscillation period) with which colour needs to be shown relative to motion in order to achieve perceptual synchrony between colour and motion (for each subject determined at their critical oscillation frequency as determined in Experiment 1). Bottom (Experiment 3): Critical periods of binding colour-colour (CoCo), colour-motion with the phase shift determined above (CoMo*), and colour-motion with zero phase shift (CoMo). Errorbars: SEM (For references of colour in this Wgure the reader is referred to the web version of the article). using the method introduced by Moutoussis and Zeki (1997) . On average, colour had to be presented with 0.086 s § 0.038 SD (n D 4 subjects) delay relative to motion for the two to be perceived synchronously (at an average alternation period of 0.512 s § 0.091 SD, n D 4 subjects) (see polar plots in Fig. 3 ). We then determined the critical binding times for colour-motion again, for stimuli with zero phase shift and ones with the phase shift as determined above for each subject such that the relative perceptual lag of motion would be compensated for. Colour-colour critical periods were determined again in the same session as a standard for the slowest within-attribute pair. In all four subjects the critical time for binding phase-shifted colourmotion was reduced (period D 0.380 s § 0.016 SD, n D 4 subjects) compared to zero-phase-shift colour-motion (period D 0.472 s § 0.084 SD), yet colour-colour binding was still faster (period D 0.303 s § 0.025 SD), as in the Wrst experiment (see bar graphs Fig. 3 ). These Wndings were signiWcant in each of the four subjects tested (p < 0.05, for both ANOVA across sessions and Monte-Carlo tests) (Fig. 3) .
Discrimination without binding
The Wnal experiment demonstrated what was perceptually evident in the 'fast' trials of the previous experiments, namely that at high alternation frequencies the distinct attributes (e.g. colour identities or motion directions) could easily be discriminated (near 100% correct), while it was impossible to associate the spatially separated stimuli to each other (chance level performance at 50% correct) (Fig. 4) . This was true even at inWnite trial lengths. These tests had been performed at oscillation periods adjusted such that subjects could conWdently perceive the constituent features of each stimulus, for motion-motion at a mean period of 0.111 s § 0.036 SD and for colour-colour at 0.167 s § 0.072 SD.
Discussion
In this study, we tried to determine the minimal stimulus presentation time necessary for associating spatially separate visual features with each other in a perceptual task. We found that: the integration time for binding varies with the attributes to be bound; binding motion to motion is signiWcantly faster than binding colour to colour; furthermore, binding across attributes, i.e., colour to motion, is slower than binding within attributes; only a part of this longer cross-attribute binding time is due to perceptual asynchrony between colour and motion. Once relative perceptual delays were compensated for, binding time for colourmotion was signiWcantly reduced, yet still longer than within-attribute binding. Finally we demonstrated that the presentation time that was necessary to perceive and discriminate attributes was considerably shorter than that required to bind them across space.
Attribute-speciWc binding and processing
The attribute-speciWc binding times are in line with our knowledge of the organization of the visual system, where colour and motion are processed in largely segregated systems (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987; Shipp & Zeki, 1985a; Shipp & Zeki, 1985b; Sincich & Horton, 2005; Zeki & Shipp, 1988; Zeki, 1978) . We acknowledge that psychophysical evidence can only provide hints about anatomical organization, though ones which are powerful enough to be worth considering. In particular, our Wndings are consistent with the faster signal conduction times, due to heavier myelination, of the cortical components of the motion system, including area V5, compared to the slower conduction times in regions involved in colour processing like area V4. In particular, these diVerences in myelination also concern long-range connections at the same hierarchical level within a pathway that connect neurons representing diVerent parts of the visual Weld. To give an example, the Wbres connecting V5 of the right hemisphere with V5 of the left hemisphere are much more heavily myelinated than corresponding Wbres connecting the two V4s (Flechsig, 1901) . Thus, if the neural processing involved in spatial binding relies on these specialized systems (at any level), one would expect binding to be more eYcient in the motion pathway than in the colour pathway, which is what we found. This leads us to suggest that spatial binding may be done at least partially within the specialized cortical components that also process the attributes. Isoluminant colours are known to be particularly ineVective motion stimuli. The fact that despite our conservative choice of isoluminant stimuli motion-motion binding was faster than colour-colour binding provides considerable reassurance of the general validity of our Wnding. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the particular stimulus parameters may aVect the binding times observed for within-attribute binding, as has been shown for perceptual latencies (Adams & Mamassian, 2004) . Our Wnding that binding across attributes was generally slower than binding Fig. 4 . Perceptual discrimination without binding at high oscillation frequencies. Shown is the mean performance for stimulus discrimination and binding across subjects ( §SEM) at a Wxed oscillation period. The oscillation period was set prior to the experiment to a level at which the subject could conWdently discriminate attributes (motion-motion stimuli: 0.111 s § 0.018 SEM; colour-colour stimuli: 0.167 s § 0.036). While subjects could easily discriminate the constituent attributes making up the stimuli near 100% correct, they performed at chance level in spatially binding these attributes.
within attributes shows that additional time is required for across-attribute binding that cannot be accounted for by the time constants involved in binding the individual attributes. This comparably slow across-attribute binding time is indicative of a comparably less eYcient communication between the cortical components of the two systems than within. This may be a direct consequence of the comparably sparse connections between the colour and motion processing pathways (Shipp & Zeki, 1995) .
Perceptual lags and binding times
It is important to note here that the time required to spatially associate stimuli seems entirely independent of the time required to process the stimuli per se. Our experiments here, as well as many previous ones, have consistently shown a substantial relative perceptual delay of motion relative to colour. This delay can be manipulated in ways that are entirely consistent with neuronal processing delays and thus seems to directly reXect neuronal processing delays in the two systems (Arnold & CliVord, 2002; Arnold et al., 2001; CliVord et al., 2004; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Viviani & Aymoz, 2001; . Despite this, the generally faster signal conduction times of the motion pathway seem at Wrst sight inconsistent with the longer perceptual delay for motion relative to colour. One purely speculative interpretation of these divergent time constants for signal conduction and perception may be that the heavier myelination (and thus faster signal conduction velocity) may be the result of evolutionary pressure to reduce relative perceptual delays, as motion processing may inherently require longer processing. In contrast to perceptual delays, we found the time constants for binding to be compatible with those of the likely anatomical substrates as discussed above.
The diVerence in time constants for perceptual delays and for spatial binding suggests that the two constitute separate processes, and our results suggest that binding acts on neural representations of the stimuli after they have been perceived, that is after their processing is complete. Direct evidence for this comes from our comparison of binding times for colour-motion stimuli that were shown either in physical synchrony or in asynchrony that led to perceptual synchrony. Critically, binding required less time for perceptually than for physically synchronous stimuli. This can only be explained through the notion that spatial binding acts at neural stages that are at or subsequent to the stage that accounts for relative perceptual delays. A very recent study by Arnold (2005) also demonstrated faster binding for colour-motion stimuli presented with a generic colourlag of 120 ms for every subject for spatially superimposed colour and motion. Our study thus conWrms this Wnding and extends it to spatially separated stimuli.
Of key importance with respect to the main Wnding of this study was however that within-attribute binding (colour-colour, i.e., the attribute with the slowest binding time) was still faster than across-attribute binding, even when the relative perceptual delay between colour and motion was compensated for. Taken together, the results of our experiments show that across-attribute binding is less eYcient than within-attribute binding, even if we account for one of the factors contributing to this, namely asynchronous processing of the distinct attributes per se. In other words, even when the neural signals to be bound are synchronized, binding is less eYcient across distinct attributes. This leads us to suggest that the communication between processing nodes that is a necessary step for binding can vary in eYciency, and in particular that it is less eYcient across specialized systems than within.
Post-conscious binding
The Wnal experiment showed that times for spatial binding are inherently longer than those for the mere stimulus processing necessary for discrimination. This allowed us to create stimuli that can be seen perfectly well, but whose constituent attributes could not be associated. This is a direct demonstration that binding across visual space is not required for the processing or the generation of a conscious percept of the visual components in it, and therefore that spatial binding is a process that can be separated from both processing and the generation of a conscious percept of visual attributes. We point this out here since it has been proposed that the very process of binding is what renders neural activity conscious (Engel, Fries, Konig, Brecht, & Singer, 1999) . If this were so, asynchronous stimulus processing would pose a major limitation for the conscious perception of stimuli consisting of more than one attribute. Instead, our results conWrm our earlier proposition that binding across space as well as across features occurs after completion of visual processing of the features per se. This is also implicit in the Wndings of Holcombe and Cavanagh (2001) , who showed that spatially superimposed colour and orientation can be bound (and thus perceived) at extremely high oscillation rates, while binding spatially separate stimuli required more time, leading them to suggest that binding of spatially superimposed colour and orientation can happen locally. Arnold (2005) showed that this is not generally true for superimposed stimuli, as binding of superimposed colour and motion is slow and depends on their relative perceptual delays.
Our results Wnally demonstrate that the time required for binding spatially separate features depends on the feature combinations to be bound, which is likely to reXect the diVerent neural pathways involved in the binding process, and that the time constants are compatible with the speciWc cortical components of the pathways processing the features concerned. Furthermore, the results show that binding is independent of stimulus processing, and that it happens at a stage after the stimuli have been perceived. These Wndings thus lead us to suggest that spatial binding is a stimulus-speciWc process that occurs after the generation of a conscious percept of the constituent attributes, thus fortifying our previous suggestion that binding is a distributed and post-conscious process Zeki & Bartels, 1999) .
